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The objective of this paper is to examine the impacts of stock market segmentations (SMS) and 
surplus free cash flow (SFCF) on income-increasing discretionary accruals. The study also 
provides the initial evidence regarding the influence of audit quality (AQ) as a moderating variable 
on those relationships. A sample of non-financial firms was taken from the list of Amman Stock 
Exchange over the period 2013-2019. Using Huber-White’s sandwich estimator for pooled OLS 
regression, the current research presents empirical evidence harmonious with the prediction in all 
hypotheses. Further, the findings document that a Big 4 auditor weakens the SMS-DAC and SFCF-
DAC associations, which suggests that the role of Big 4 audit firms is effective in mitigating 
management’s opportunistic behaviour. However, the reported results provide beneficial 
information to investors, regulators, external auditors, policymakers, shareholders, and other 
countries with similar institutional environment. 
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1. Introduction 
The earnings management (EM) phenomenon remains controversial and has grown over the last 
two decades (Hashim et al., 2013). Corporate collapses that shocked the business world like; 
Arthur Anderson, WorldCom, Satyam, Tyco, HIH Insurance and Enron have strongly indicated 
that many of today’s corporations are engaging in EM. Not only abroad, but EM cases have also 
occurred in Jordan, such as the Shamayleh Gate scandal. 
 
The number of listed firms on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) at the end of 2019 was 191 
compared with 240 companies in 2013. This drop was attributable to the delisting of 40 non-
financial firms by virtue of the listing securities directives (ASE, 2020). According to JSC (2020), 
31 of these delisted companies had violated the Securities Law provisions concerning financial 
reporting practices. Accordingly, the series of violations from 2013-2019 point out the inability of 
the listed companies to present accurate financial reports to their stockholders. Thus, this 
articulates that EM is an issue of concern in Jordan. 
 
Previous research suggests the need to examine EM behaviour from two perspectives, incentive or 
monitoring perspectives. This article examines EM from both points of views. From the incentive 
perspective, the objective of this research is twofold. First, as of October 1, 2012, the board of 
directors of ASE issued decision number (33/2012), which stated that the price thresholds of the 
traded stocks increased to ±7.5% instead of ±5% of the last traded price, and this advantage only 
applied to companies listed in the first market. The price threshold for the companies listed in the 
second and third market remained at ±5% of the last traded price (ASE, 2017). With that being 
said, the article provides a new and different insight on the listing requirements in Jordan by 
observing the consequences of the recent regulation of ASE. From this vantage point, this study 
strives to identify the impact of the stock market segmentations (SMS) on income-increasing 
discretionary accruals (DAC). 
 
Second, based on the tenets of agency theory (Barkhordar & Tehrani, 2016; Fakhroni et al., 2018; 
Nouri & Gilaninia, 2017; Nurdiana, 2021), there is a possibility that managers are stimulated to 
exploit free cash flow in non-wealth-maximising investments for their personal gains and then 
resort to manipulating reported earnings to camouflage the consequences of their poor investments. 
The relationship between EM and surplus free cash flow (SFCF) has been examined in developed 
countries, with little attention paid to developing countries (see Cardoso et al., 2014; Sari et al., 
2021; Toumeh et al., 2020a; Toumeh et al., 2020b). Also, Jordanian companies hold a large amount 
of cash (Al-Amarneh, 2015; Alnawaiseh & Alomari, 2017), creating a good impetus for the present 
research to investigate income-increasing DAC in the situation of SFCF in Jordan. 
  
From a monitoring perspective, agency theory proposed that monitoring mechanisms would 
produce control over the process of financial reporting and deterred EM practices (Kazemian & 
Sanusi, 2015; Toumeh & Yahya, 2019). A high-quality audit minimises the information 
asymmetry that occurs between managers and stockholders (Alzoubi, 2018). In this vein, audit 
quality (AQ) may boost the value relevance of earnings and increase the usefulness of accounting 
figures in the decision-making process (Alfraih, 2016). Thus, the present research assumes that 
AQ would weaken the associations among SMS, SFCF, and income-increasing DAC. However, 





this is the initial empirical study to examine the moderating role of AQ on the nature of the 
relationship between SMS and income-increasing EM. 
 
In methodological terms, the major studies that have examined the impact of SFCF on EM have 
utilised pure cross-section or pure time-series data, especially in developing countries (e.g., Bukit 
& Iskandar, 2009, Astami et al., 2017, Bhundia, 2012). Baltagi (2008) stated that panel data could 
better recognise and measure impacts that are not detectable in purely cross-section or time-series 
data. Therefore, this paper employed panel data analysis to derive conclusions. 
 
The remainder of this research is structured as follows. The next section reviews the most pertinent 
literature and hypotheses development. Next, the research method, including the sample and data 
collection, operational definitions of the variables, and the empirical model equations, are 
provided. The penultimate section articulates the findings and their interpretations. Concluding 
remarks, implications, and avenues for future research are then discussed in the final section. 
2.   Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1 SMS and Income-increasing Discretionary Accruals 
The secondary market of ASE is divided into three sub-markets: the first, second, and third market. 
On an international level, this division is similar to many other countries that have sectioned their 
stock market via different listing requirements like USA, UK, Japan, and China (see Honjo & 
Nagaoka, 2018; Khurshed et al., 2018; Sarkar, 2016; Ward et al., 2018). 
Chen and Yuan (2004) indicated that listed companies on China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) are required to reach a minimum of 10% return on equity to issue additional 
shares. They documented that the managers of Chinese companies have used income-increasing 
EM to achieve the accounting threshold value. 
Haw et al. (2005) found that Chinese listed firms have engaged in income-increasing DAC 
practices to meet regulatory requirements of stock rights issues. They concluded that firms that 
failed to attain regulatory permission for stock rights issue used EM practices more than firms that 
have successfully received the permission. Yu et al. (2006), Yang (2015), and Lento and Yeung 
(2017) have reported comparable findings. In the same context, numerous research, including 
Cheng et al. (2010) and Zhang et al. (2012), found that loss-makers are induced to manipulate their 
reported earnings using DAC to preserve their listing status. 
 
In Taiwan, Jaggi et al. (2006) stated that the Taiwan Securities and Futures Exchange Commission 
(TSFEC) mandated IPO companies to report annual earnings forecasts for two successive years 
before stock rights offerings with a 20% forecast error threshold. The findings revealed that 
Taiwanese regulatory requirements promote EM practices in Taiwan because the management of 
IPO companies manage reported earnings, so they do not deviate from the projected earnings. 
Likewise, Cormier and Martinez (2006) found comparable findings in France, while Ismail and 
Weetman (2008) found comparable findings in Malaysia.  
 
In Jordan, the listing requirements of ASE differ depending on its market segmentations, and listed 
companies are confronted with specific listing criteria. Under the provisions of “Article (72) of the 
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Securities Law No. 76 of 2002” and the provisions of “Article (24.B.1) of the Internal Bylaw of 
the ASE of 2004,” the requirements of the first market in terms of earnings are the following. The 
listing of the company's shares is transferred to the first market if a company has net profits before 
tax for a minimum of two years of the three years before the transfer of listing, provided the 
company's average net pre-tax profit for the latest three years are at least 5% of the company's 
paid-in capital. According to decision number 33/2012 of Amman Stock Exchange`s board of 
directors; companies listed in the first market have the privilege of being allowed more flexible 
stock price thresholds, which is ±7.5% of the last traded price, while other listed companies are 
allowed with only ±5% of the last traded price (ASE, 2017). 
 
Using institutional theory, Makhaiel and Sherer (2017) highlighted that meeting a particular level 
of net income that other companies have published exerted mimetic pressure on firms whose 
profits below that level to manipulate their earnings to create the desired financial image and 
present financial results comparable to that of their peers. They also argued that the regulatory 
agent in the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) applies coercive pressures on listed firms to comply with 
its regulatory requirements. One of these rules is that companies must earn a particular level of 
earnings, which may push management to manage the reported earnings upwardly and publish 
favourable financial reports in an attempt to be viewed as more legitimate and reputable. 
Furthermore, Makhaiel and Sherer (2017) indicated that the application of institutional theory 
proposes that EM is a technique that managers resort in order to comply with external pressures 
such as listing requirements. 
 
Against the above argument, this article assumes that a firm listed in the other markets is motivated 
to reach the 5% average net pre-tax profit to boost their ranking to the first market, which, in turn, 
may lead to incentivising firms that are listed on the ASE to use positive DAC. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is posited: 
 Hypothesis 1: Firms that are listed in the other markets are more likely to use income-
 increasing DAC than otherwise. 
2.2 SFCF and Income-increasing Discretionary Accruals 
Agency theory explains the relationship between SFCF and EM. It posits that if managers and 
shareholders goals are not aligned, management is more apt either to waste free cash flow on 
organisation inefficiencies or to invest free cash flow in negative NPV projects that only maximise 
the wealth of managers while ignoring the interests of shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Fakhroni et al. 
(2018), Wang et al. (2015), and Yaari et al. (2016), among others, professed that if free cash flow 
is not employed to boost the shareholders` interest, then an agency problem exists.  
The free cash flow problem is allied to low growth opportunities (Jensen, 1986; Lehn & Poulsen, 
1989). Jaggi and Gul (2005) concluded that managers of low growth firms with high free cash 
flow engaged in income-boosting DAC to conceal the results of their non-value maximising 
investments. Using a sample of companies listed in the United States, Chung et al. (2005) found 
that management used positive DAC to cover the impact of marginal NPV investments on the 
reported earnings. Previous studies by Bhundia (2012) (for India), Barkhordar and Tehrani (2016) 
(for Iran), Cardoso et al. (2014) (for Brazil), Bukit and Nasution (2015) (for Indonesia) have also 





determined that companies with SFCF situation tended to employ accounting procedures and 
accounting discretion that increase their earnings.   
In a situation in which a firm has a combination of low growth opportunities and a high free cash 
flow; management might make inefficient investment decisions for their interests, and thus they 
may be involved in income-increasing DAC to demonstrate the superior performance of a firm 
(Bukit & Iskandar, 2009). That leads to the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 2: Firms with SFCF are more likely to use income-increasing DAC than 
 otherwise. 
2.3 The Moderating Effect of AQ 
An important role of the external auditors is to reveal whether a company`s income statement and 
balance sheet are presented fairly. Thus, improving the quality of an audit service assists provide 
users of financial statements with reasonable assurance that reported accruals are accurate and then 
certifies the quality of the reported earnings (Al-Thuneibat et al., 2011). Agency theory suggests 
that management needs high-quality monitoring to diminish agency problems and assure the 
transparency of the financial results (Miko & Kamardin, 2015). AQ is considered an effective 
governance mechanism that detects material misstatements and minimises EM practices (Astami 
et al., 2017; Alzoubi, 2016). 
AQ can be determined based on features that are identified in the International Standards on 
Auditing (ISA), such as independence, the exercise of due professional care, and competence (Lin 
& Hwang, 2010). These features will help determine complex transactions, which should probably 
be present in Big 4 auditors (Habbash & Alghamdi, 2017). Big 4 auditors provide higher assurance 
that financial reports faithfully reflect the real picture of a company (Alfraih, 2016). Further, Big 
4 audit firms possess huge client bases and would tarnish their reputations if they perform poor 
quality audit service (Jordan et al., 2010). Finally, Big 4 auditors have considerable expertise in 
conducting integrated audits for publicly listed companies to effectively recognise and test the 
clients' internal controls (Brown et al., 2016). 
 
Prior researchers have investigated the influence of AQ on EM. For example, based on a sample 
of 10,379 Big 6 and 2,179 non-Big 6 firms, Becker et al. (1998) found that companies audited by 
non-Big Six 6 audit firms had higher reported DAC accruals than those that Big Six 6 audit firms 
audited. Utilising a sample of all private companies in Belgium, Finland, United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Spain, and France during the period 1998-2002, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
(2008) indicated that the reputational concerns of Big 4 audit firms led to the effective monitoring 
of the moral risk in the companies. They added that AQ was effective in reducing earnings 
manipulation practices. In the Jordanian context, using a sample of listed firms on ASE, Alzoubi 
(2016) determined that AQ was associated negatively with EM. He found that companies that used 
Big 4 audit firms had significantly lower EM levels than companies that hired non- Big 4 audit 
firms. Likewise, Waweru and Prot (2018) documented comparable results 
 
Along this line of argument, Chung et al. (2005) provided evidence suggesting that the usage of a 
Big 6 auditor played a significant role in limiting DAC manipulation, specifically in SFCF 
situation. They justified this result by highlighting that Big 6 auditors are more cautious when 
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agency costs are severe in their clients to avoid litigation risks. So, the role of AQ in constraining 
EM is strong when the firms have high levels of SFCF. Thus, the research promotes the following 
hypothesis: 
     Hypothesis 3a: High-quality auditors weaken the positive relationship of SFCF and 
 income-increasing DAC. 
Under institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), hiring high-quality 
auditors can be considered a coercive isomorphism derived from formal or informal pressures 
exerted on a firm. AQ could also be a mimetic isomorphism. Doluwarawaththa and Gooneratne 
(2017) said that companies attempt to improve their legitimacy in their field through mimicry of 
the practices of successful companies. Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) stressed that normative 
persuasion is conveyed among professional accountants and auditors, wherein a higher level of 
practices can be obtained. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
     Hypothesis 3b: High-quality auditors weaken the positive relationship of SMS and 
 income-increasing DAC. 
3     Research Method 
3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
The initial sample comprises all firms listed on the ASE (194 listed firms) during 7 years from 
2013 to 2019. From this sample, all listed companies in the financial sector are excluded because 
they have different working capital structure (Abed et al., 2012), unique financial statements that 
contain different components (Soliman & Ragab, 2014), and different regulatory requirements 
(Noor et al., 2015). Thus, the sample includes all non-financial listed firms drawn from two 
industries (services and industrial), and the financial reports of the selected firms must be available 
and cover all the period from 2013 to 2019. Outliers were intentionally not excluded because 
observations with extreme values of DAC are suggestive of management discretion. Removing 
either the highest positive or negative observations might lead to the exclusion of EM cases that 
are the focus of this particular study (Alzoubi, 2018). The final sample size is 644 firm-year 
observations about 92 firms for 2013-2019. Data on selected firms were hand-collected from the 
annual reports of the non-financial listed firms and the ASE website at https://www.ase.com.jo/en. 
 
3.2     Operational Definitions  
3.2.1 Dependent Variable: Earnings Management  
 
DAC are measured cross-sectionally for each year and each industry through the modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al.,1995) as defined below: 
 
= 𝛼 + α + α
(∆ ∆  )  +  α
&  + ε                                                         (1) 
Where 𝛼  is the constant; α α  and α  are the alphas; TAC  is the total accruals in year t; ∆REV  
the change in revenue among year t−1 and t; ∆REC   the change in receivables in year t; PP&E  the 
gross property, plant, and in year t; TA  the lagged total assets; and ε  the residuals. 





This study minimises the problem of heteroscedasticity by deflating each variable included in the 
model by the book value of total assets from the previous year. 
 
Total accruals (TAC) is calculated based on the balance sheet approach as below: 
 
𝑇𝐴𝐶 =  ∆𝐶𝐴 −  ∆𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ −  ∆𝐶𝐿 +  ∆𝐷𝐶𝐿 −  𝐷𝐸𝑃                                                                                                          (2) 
Where TAC the total accruals; ∆CA the change in current assets; ∆Cash the change in cash and 
cash equivalents; ∆CL the change in current liabilities; ∆DCL the change in short term debt 
included in current liabilities; DEP the depreciation and amortisation expense. 
 
TAC is assumed to be the sum of two components: non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. 
Non-discretionary accruals occur from the normal business operations and are beyond 
management control, while discretionary accruals arise from the choices made by the firm's 
management (Dechow et al., 1995). Therefore, DAC is calculated as below:  
 
𝐷𝐴𝐶 = 𝑇𝐴𝐶 − 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶                                                                                                                                                                        (3) 
 
Where 𝑁𝐷𝐴𝐶  denotes the non-discretionary accruals divided by the lagged total assets. 
 
The fitted values from equation (1) represent the NDAC, while the residual term ε  (difference 
between TAC and NDAC) is used to capture EM. 
3.2.2 Independent Variable: Stock Market Segmentations  
SMS is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if a firm is listed in the other markets (second and third 
market), and 0 if a company is listed in the first market. The second and third markets are included 
as other markets because both markets have no regulatory requirements regarding the reported 
earnings, and both markets have the same stock price movements in their daily share prices (±5%).  
3.2.3 Independent Variable: Surplus Free Cash Flow  
Following Cardoso et al. (2014), Bukit and Iskandar (2009), Bhundia (2012), the FCF is measured 
using the model of Lehn and Poulsen (1989), where FCF for every company and every year is 
calculated by operating income before depreciation minus expenses like interest expense, tax 
expense, and dividends, scaled by dividing it with total assets as below: 
 
𝐹𝐶𝐹 =
(𝐼𝑁𝐶  − 𝑇𝐴𝑋 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃 − 𝑃𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑉 − 𝐶𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑉 )
𝑇𝐴
 
Where FCF  is the free cash flow; INC  is the operating income before depreciation; TAX  is the 
total income taxes; INTEXP  is the interest expense; PSDIV  is the preferred stock dividends; 
CSDIV  is the ordinary stock dividends; and TA  is the total lagged assets. 
SFCF situation is estimated using two proxies, the FCF and the growth prospects of a firm. Growth 
opportunities are determined by the price to book ratio. Then, SFCF is is a binary variable coded 
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1 if the FCF of a firm is above the median for the year and the price to book ratio is below the 
median for the year, otherwise SFCF is coded 0. 
3.2.4 Moderator Variable: Audit Quality 
In current practice, the audit firm size could be a convenient proxy for AQ (Habbash & Alghamdi, 
2017, Lopes, 2018). Therefore, this study measures AQ as a dummy variable utilising the audit 
firm size. AQ is scored 1 if a Big 4 audit firm audits a company, otherwise AQ is scored 0. 
3.2.5 Control Variables 
The recent growing literature has articulated that larger firms are less apt to use positive DAC 
(Nekhili et al., 2016). Company size (CSIZE) is calculated by the natural logarithm of total assets 
(Fakhroni et al., 2018). Agency theory confirmed the role of dividend in reducing the agency 
problem of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Dividend yield (DIYD) is measured by the ratio of 
dividend to the share market value (Noor et al., 2015). Companies with large debt face a high level 
of risk, and thus management may choose income-increasing EM to meet the debt covenants 
(Abbadi et al., 2016). The debt ratio (DEBT) is calculated as the ratio of total debt (long-term and 
short-term) to the total assets of a company (Alhadab, 2018). Previous studies have found a 
negative relationship between total accruals and DAC (Becker et al., 1998). The absolute value of 
total accruals (ATAC) is measured by the absolute value of total accruals divided by lagged total 
assets (Bukit & Iskandar, 2009). Abed et al. (2012) documented that companies listed on the ASE 
under the service sector are more likely to manage their earnings than those under the industrial 
sector. Industry type (IDUS) is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if a company is under the 
industrial sector and 0 if otherwise. 
3.3 Empirical Model Equations 
Four pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions were applied to test the hypotheses. The 




DAC = β + β  SMS + β  SFCF + β  𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + β  DIYD + β  DEBT + β  ATAC
+ β  IDUS + u  
Model 2: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶 = β + β  SMS + β  SFCF + 𝛽  𝐴𝑄 + β  CSIZE + β  DIYD + β  DEBT
+ β  ATAC + β  IDUS + u  
Model 3: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶 = 𝛽 + 𝛽  𝑆𝑀𝑆 + 𝛽  𝑆𝐹𝐶𝐹 + 𝛽  𝐴𝑄 + 𝛽  𝑆𝑀𝑆 ∗ 𝐴𝑄 + 𝛽  𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽  𝐷𝐼𝑌𝐷
+ 𝛽  𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 + 𝛽  𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽  𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑆 + 𝑢  
Model 4: 
𝐷𝐴𝐶 = 𝛽 + 𝛽  𝑆𝑀𝑆 + 𝛽  𝑆𝐹𝐶𝐹 + 𝛽  𝐴𝑄 + 𝛽  𝑆𝐹𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝐴𝑄 + 𝛽  𝐶𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽  𝐷𝐼𝑌𝐷
+ 𝛽  𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 + 𝛽  𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐶 + 𝛽  𝐼𝐷𝑈𝑆 + 𝑢  
Where DAC is the signed value of discretionary accruals derived from the modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al.,1995). The rest of the variables have already been summarised above. 





4.  Analysis and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the study’s dependent, independent and control variables. 
The average of DAC is -0.016 varies from -0.579 to 0.577. This finding aligns with prior research 
in Jordan (Alhadab, 2018, Azzoz et al., 2016). CSIZE, on average, is 17.250 of the company 
sample and ranges from 13.626 to 21.310. This result is similar to the Jordanian research of Abbadi 
et al. (2016), who documented a mean CSIZE of 17.034 with a minimum value of 13.060 and a 
maximum value of 21.292. The mean of DIYD is 2.607, which is in line with Al-Amarneh (2015), 
who found an average of DIYD of 2.900 in Jordan. Table 1 shows that the sample average DIBT 
is 0.345 with a minimum and maximum value of 0.000 and 1.073, respectively. This finding 
harmonious with Siam et al. (2018) who published an average of DIBT of 0.383 among 
manufacturing Jordanian firms. The study documents a mean of ATAC to be about 0.087. 
Concerning the dichotomous variables, Table 1 specifies that 40.06% of the sampled firms were 
listed in the first market, and 59.94% were from firms listed in the other markets. About 20% of 
the firms had an SFCF situation suggesting a potential agency problem. This number is similar to 
other related research (Astami et al., 2017). Data on AQ reports that, on average, 39.91% of the 
observations (257) were audited by Big 4 audit firms, compared to 60.09% (387) audited by non-
Big 4 auditors. This aligns with the latest Jordanian study of Alhababsah (2019), who found that 
37% of the listed firms were audited by a Big 4 auditor. Finally, 51.09% of the sample were 
categorised under the industrial sector, and 48.91% were categorised under the service sector. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Continuous variables 
DAC 644 -0.016 -0.137 0.110 -0.579 0.577 
CSIZE 644 17.250 17.210 1.430 13.626 21.310 
DIYD 644 2.607 0.000 3.150 0.000 11.627 
DIBT 644 0.345 0.299 0.243 0.000 1.073 
ATAC 644 0.087 0.060 0.146 0.000 2.750 
Dichotomous Variables 
 Observations  0  1  
SMS 
 
644  258 (40.06 %) 
 
 386 (59.94 %)  
SFCF 644  514 (79.81 %) 
 
 130 (20.19 %)  
AQ 
 
644  387 (60.09 %) 
 
 257 (39.91 %)  
IDUS 
 
644  315 (48.91 %) 
 
 329 (51.09%)  
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4.2 Correlation Analysis 
Table 2 provides the variables` correlation matrix tested in this study. None of the bivariate 
correlation coefficients among the independent variables were significantly highly correlated (≥ 
0.80), which means that multicollinearity was not a major problem in interpreting the regression 
coefficients. The highest correlation between the variables was -0.489 (SMS and DIYD). The 
magnitude of the correlations between independent variables under study varied from -0.489 to 
0.433. SMS, SFCF, and AQ were significantly correlated with DAC at 1% significance levels. 
 
Table 2 Pearson Correlation 
Variable DAC
  
SMS SFCF AQ CSIZE DIYD DIBT ATAC IDUS 
DAC 1         
SMS 0.127*** 1        
SFCF 0.132*** 0.103*** 1       
AQ -0.240*** -0.110*** -0.038 1      
CSIZE -0.156*** -0.390*** 0.020 0.433*** 1     
DIYD -0.014 -0.489*** 0.113*** 0.120*** 0.208*** 1    
DIBT -0.054 0.043 0.041 0.097** -0.009 0.016 1   
ATAC 0.016 -0.035 -0.046 -0.072* -0.048 0.044 0.009 1  
IDUS -0.025 0.130*** 0.020 -0.154*** -0.176*** -0.097** 0.000 0.013 1 
Note: *, **, and *** denote the significance level at 0.1, .05, and 0.01 respectively. 
 
4.3 Univariate Analysis 
Table 3 shows the findings for differences in DAC cross sub-samples formed on the basis of SMS, 
SFCF, and AQ. As shown in panel A of Table 3, observations listed in the other markets had higher 
DAC than those listed in the first market. The differences were highly significant at a 0.01 level. 
This result indicates that firms under the other markets tend to manage their earnings upwardly to 
meet the earnings criteria of the first market that ASE has set. The results support the first 
hypothesis. Panel B illustrates that the mean of DAC of companies with high SFCF was 
significantly higher than those companies with low SFCF at p = 0.000. This finding is consistent 
with the second hypothesis, which implies that firms with high SFCF were more apt to choose 
income-increasing DAC to show better performance.  In Panel C, the mean of DAC in companies 
that hired Big 4 audit firms was lower than those companies that used non-Big 4 auditors at the 
0.01 significance level. This evidence suggests that Big 4 audit firms constrain management from 
engaging in income-increasing EM. Panel C shows that observations with Big 4 audit firms have 
significantly lower DAC at 0.01 level. This evidence implies that Big 4 auditors mitigate the 
positive DAC. 
Panel D displays the mean of DAC of combinations between different levels of SMS and AQ. The 
mean of DAC for firms listed in other markets and that used the services of Big 4 audit firms was 





lower at p = 0.000 than those firms listed in the other markets that non-Big 4 auditors had audited. 
Likewise, firms listed in the first market that Big 4 audit firms audited had a significantly lower 
DAC than firms from the same category that non-Big 4 auditors had audited. The evidence aligns 
with Panels A and C. Panel E shows the four-way partitioning of DAC based on both SFCF and 
AQ. Findings suggest that firms with high SFCF and that used Big 4 auditors had a significantly 
lower mean of DAC at the 0.01 level than those firms with high SFCF that had non-Big 4 auditors 
had audited. Similarly, the mean of DAC for the observations low SFCF and Big 4 audit firms had 
a significantly lower DAC at the 0.01 significance level than those observations with low SFCF 
and non-Big 4 audit firms. The finding is consistent with Panels B and C. 
 
Table 3 Univariate Test Differences in DAC between Sub-samples 
Panel A: SMS Sub-Samples – First Market (SMS = 0) and Other Markets (SMS = 1) 
 
 
 First Market  
(SMS = 0) 
Other Markets 







Mean of DAC -0.033 
 
-0.004  -0.029 -2.254 0.001 
Observations 258 386    
Panel B: SFCF Sub-Samples – Low SFCF (SFCF = 0) and High SFCF (SFCF = 1) 
 
 
 Low SFCF  
(SFCF = 0) 
High SFCF 







Mean of DAC -0.023 0.013 -0.036 -3.374 0.000 
Observations 514 130    
Panel C: AQ Sub-Samples – Non-Big 4 (AQ = 0) and Big 4 (AQ = 1) 
 
 
 Non-Big 4  
(AQ = 0) 
Big 4  







Mean of DAC 0.006 -0.048 0.054 6.264 0.000 
Observations 387 257    
Panel D: Four-Way Partitioning of DAC for SMS and AQ Sub-Samples 
 
 
  Non-Big 4 Big 4 t p 
First Market  
(SMS = 0) 
Mean of DAC 






Other Markets  
(SMS = 1) 







t  -3.249 -0.233   
p  0.001 0.816   
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Panel E: Four-Way Partitioning of DAC for SFCF and AQ Sub-Samples  
 
 
  Non-Big 4 Big 4 t p 
Low SFCF  
(SFCF = 0) 








(SFCF = 1) 







t  -3.6180 -0.530   
p  0.000 0.597   
4.4 Multivariate Analysis and Method Selection 
Following Gujarati and Porter (2009), the study used the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier 
(LM), Wald analysis of testing the time-fixed effects, and Hausman tests to verify the assumptions 
of the most appropriate model for the dataset. The results of Table 4 indicate that the most suitable 
estimation method to be applied was the pooled OLS regression model. 
Table 4 Lagrange Multiplier (LM), Wald Analysis, and the Hausman Tests 
Test P-value 
Lagrangian Multiplier (LM) test 1.000 
Wald Test  0.142 
Hausman test 0.389 
After selecting the appropriate estimation method, diagnostic tests of panel data assumptions 
become essential before performing regression analysis. These tests include multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation tests. The variance inflation factor and tolerance are 
employed as a second indicator to detect a multicollinearity problem. The White`s test and the 
modified Wald test for group-wise heteroscedasticity are used for heteroscedasticity (Stockemer, 
2018). Finally, the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data is applied to judge whether 
the data under investigation is free from an autocorrelation problem (Field, 2013). 
Table 5 Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor 




SMS 2.15 0.465 
SFCF 1.69 0.593 
AQ 2.99 0.334 
CSIZE 1.47 0.681 
DIYD 1.43 0.701 
DIBT 1.03 0.972 
ATAC 1.02 0.984 





IDUS 1.05 0.953 
Mean VIF 1.78  
 
 
Table 6 Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Tests 
 White`s Test 
 
Modified Wald Test Wooldridge Test 
Chi-Square(2) value / F-value 
 
98.31 3383.91 1.790 
df 51 92 1,91 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.184 
The results as in Table 5 prove that the multicollinearity problem did not exist because the 
maximum VIF was 2.99, which is less than 10. The minimum value of the tolerance was 0.334, 
which is more than the cut-off value of 0.10. As illustrated in Table 6, the findings of the White`s 
test and the modified Wald test show that the data suffer from a heteroscedasticity issue. Further, 
the outcome of the Wooldridge test reports that the error terms were uncorrelated and 
independently distributed, which means that the data is free from first-order autocorrelation. 
Given that the results of White`s test and the modified Wald still indicates evidence of 
heteroscedasticity, the robust standard error method (Huber-White’s sandwich estimator) is 
utilised as a reliable solution to diagnose this issue (Froot, 1989, Wooldridge, 2010). 
Table 7 presents the findings of the robust standard errors for pooled OLS regression models 
(Model 1-4) on associations between SMS, SFCF, and DAC, including the moderating effects of 
AQ on those relationships. As shown in Table 7, the results of every model are all statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. A consistent result across all the models is that SMS had a positive 
and significant association with DAC. This result means that companies listed in the other markets 
were more likely to use income-increasing EM than those listed in the first market. This result is 
in line with the first hypothesis. Here, the increase in the reported earnings may lead these firms 
to meet the earnings condition of the first market such that they can more easily transfer their 
shares to that market. The SFCF variable had a positive sign in all model specifications and is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This result supports the prediction of hypothesis 2 that 
firms with high SFCF were more apt to engage in income-increasing DAC to camouflage the 
results of their non-value-maximising investments. The evidence corroborates the univariate 
outcome reported in Table 3 as well as in prior studies (Bhundia, 2012; Bukit & Iskandar, 2009 
Nekhili et al., 2016). 
 
Before examining the moderator role of AQ, it was included as an independent variable and had a 
consistently negative and significant relationship with earnings management measure (DAC) in 
all the models. This suggests that firms that Big 4 audit firms audited had reported lower DAC 
than firms that used the services of non-Big 4 audit firms. One interpretation of this finding is that 
big four auditors coerce client firms to deter the use of positive DAC. Previous research, which 
shows consistent results of AQ and income-increasing DAC, include Alzoubi (2016), Miko and 
Kamardin (2015), Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008), and Waweru and Prot (2018).  
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Model 3 looks at the moderating role of AQ on the relationship between SMS and DAC. The 
regression finding reveals the interaction term coefficient, AQ*SMS, was negative and significant 
at the 0.05 level and supported hypothesis 3b. Thus, Big 4 auditors act to reduce income-increasing 
DAC activities, and they are especially influential in firms listed in the other markets. Similarly, 
the beta coefficient of the moderating effects of AQ*SFCF in model 4 had the anticipated negative 
sign, and the coefficient was significant at the .05 level. This result means that in firms with high 
SFCF situation, Big 4 auditors were more vigilant in constraining income-increasing EM. This 
evidence aligns with hypothesis 3a, in which AQ was posited to weaken the positive association 
between income-increasing DAC and SFCF. The results are directionally consistent with Astami 
et al. (2017), Rusmin et al. (2014), and Chung et al. (2005), who stressed that Big 4 audit firms 
could mitigate the positive DAC in SFCF situation. 
  
Table 7 Huber-White’s Sandwich Estimator for Pooled OLS Regression 




































































































0.055 0.092 0.099 0.098 
F-statistic (p-
value) 
4.52*** 7.67*** 7.94*** 7.81*** 
Observations 644 644 644 644 
Note: *, **, and *** denote the significance level at 0.1, .05, and 0.01 respectively. 





The analysis of the control variables, including CSIZE, DIYD, DIBT, ATAC, and IDUS, is shown 
in Table 7. From the table, it can be seen that CSIZE was negatively and significantly associated 
with DAC at the 0.01 level. This result corroborates the study of El Moslemany and Nathan (2019). 
It means that the level of positive DAC was lower in large companies, as they under pressure from 
their shareholders. Nevertheless, CSIZE was not significantly associated with DAC when AQ and 
the interaction terms of AQ were included in the regression, indicating that CSIZE influences 
management’s opportunistic behaviour, but this relationship was affected by Big 4 auditors. IDUS 
had a negative sign in all models and was statistically significant in most of them. This result 
suggests that firms listed under the service sector had a higher positive DAC than those under the 
industrial sector, consistent with Abed et al. (2012). Finally, DIYD, DIBT, and ATAC variables 
were not significantly related to DAC. These results contradict prior research in other contexts (see 
Noor et al., 2015; Nekhili et al., 2016; Nouri & Gilaninia, 2017). 
4.5 Additional Sensitivity and Robustness Checks 
This research performed two additional analyses to examine the robustness of the findings. The 
first reveals the direction and size of the bivariate correlations among the variables using the non-
parametric analogue to Pearson correlation, namely, the Spearman correlation test, and the second 
is the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test which is a non-parametric statistic 
alternative for an independent sample t-test. 
 
Table 8 Spearman Correlation Matrix 
Variables DAC SMS SFCF AQ CSIZE DIYD DEBT ATAC INDUS 
DAC 1         
SMS 0.112*** 1        
SFCF 0.125*** 0.103*** 1       
AQ -0.311*** -0.110*** -0.038 1      
CSIZE -0.112*** -0.401*** 0.003 0.422*** 1     
DIYD -0.032 -0.517*** 0.083** 0.146*** 0.240*** 1    
DEBT -0.052 0.102*** 0.040 0.128*** 0.025 -0.026 1   
ATAC -0.111*** 0.089** -0.085** 0.003 -0.038 0.034 -0.020 1  
IDUS -0.047 0.126*** 0.020 -0.154*** -0.202*** -0.101*** -0.000 0.105*** 1 
Note: *, **, and *** denote the significance level at 0.1, .05, and 0.01 respectively. 
 
As shown in Table 8, the explanatory variables SMS and SFCF were positively and significantly 
correlated with DAC at 0.01 level. Additionally, the Spearman correlation coefficient between AQ 
and DAC was -0.311 at 0.01 significance level. These findings lead to the conclusion that 
Spearman correlation test results were comparable with the results of Pearson correlation test 
conducted earlier. 
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Table 9 Two-sample Wilcoxon Rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) Test 
Panel A: SMS Sub-Samples – First Market (SMS = 0) and Other Markets (SMS = 1) 
 First Market 
(SMS = 0) 




Rank Sum 76631 131059 -2.841 0.004 
Observations  258 386   
Panel B: SFCF Sub-Samples – Low SFCF (SFCF = 0) and High SFCF (SFCF = 1) 
 Low SFCF 
(SFCF = 0) 
High SFCF 





Rank Sum 159778 47912 -3.159 0.002 
Observations 514 130   
Panel C: AQ Sub-Samples – Non-Big 4 (AQ = 0) and Big 4 (AQ = 1) 
 Non-Big 4 
(AQ = 0) 
Big 4 





Rank Sum 143048 64642 7.889 0.000 
Observations 387 257   
The results in Table 9 shows that the p-values of the variables SMS, SFCF, and AQ were 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level, which means that no differences exist between the chief 
tests implementing the non-parametric analysis and the parametric analysis for the findings. The 
outcome of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was in line with the results reported for the t-test of 
the independent sample in Table 3. Eventually, the results of this research could be deemed robust 
when different pertinent statistical techniques were implemented. 
5 Conclusion  
The proxy for the earnings management phenomenon, discretionary accruals, provides various 
management mechanisms to adjust the reported profit towards some preferred levels. A growing 
body of literature has investigated managers' incentives for using DAC and has utilised these 
incentives to predict EM. The current article extends this line of research by examining the 
association between SMS, SFCF, and DAC and the direct and moderating effect of AQ. First, this 
article argues that firms listed in the other markets were incentivised to choose the upward 
manipulation of DAC to fulfil the earnings-based criteria of the first market so that they can 
transfer their shares to that market. As a result, firms would preserve their competitiveness with 
their peers, and stockholders would view them as more reputable and favourably. Also, those firms 
will be differentiated in the allowed stock price threshold in their daily share prices. The empirical 
findings using data from 2013 to 209 confirm the hypothesis of a positive association between 
SMS and DAC. In a surplus free cash flow situation, management makes self-serving investments 
that do not maximise the shareholders` wealth and employs accounting discretion to inflate 
earnings. The present study provides support for the hypothesis suggesting a positive relationship 





between SFCF and DAC. On the other hand, the study offers conclusive evidence that Big 4 
auditors in Jordan force management to reduce income-increasing DAC due to their independence 
and desire to steer clear of litigation risk. This behaviour is particularly strong in two situations; 
when firms are listed in the other markets and low growth firms have a high free cash flow.  
Based on these findings, the article raises probable implications for economic reformers and 
regulators about managerial behaviour related to the segmented stock markets of ASE. The 
findings provide beneficial information about how both earnings-based condition and the 
advantages of being listed in the first market influence the quality of financial reports. Further, the 
association of SFCF and income-increasing EM choice is applicable in Jordan. Therefore, the 
results also provide new insights to stockholders and investors concerning EM activities that the 
SFCF situation could impact. Indeed, the study will help them fully picture the potential negative 
side when their firms hold a high SFCF. Moreover, the Big 4 auditors have a crucial role in 
mitigating the behaviour of management in selecting the income-increasing DAC, especially for 
those firms that wish to transfer their shares into the first market. Thus, the ASE may first pay 
more attention to firms applying for the transfer, and second, require that Big 4 audit firms audit 
the financial reports of listed firms to ensure that the earnings-based criteria of the first market 
have not led to choose positive DAC. 
This study adopted the traditional classification of Big 4 audit firms as a proxy for audit quality; 
thus, future research could explore a better measure of this variable to enrich the framework of this 
study. Also, future research may conduct a comparative study of Jordan with different countries 
that have distinct environments to highlight the impact of other institutional settings and to increase 
generalisability. Finally, early in the year 2020, the pandemic of COVID-19 has exerted varied 
effects on many firms' financial performance, and one of these impacts is earnings shortfalls. These 
decreases in the published earnings may be an influential driver leading management to employ 
accounting procedures that boost their earnings. Therefore, future research might be directed 
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